A Comparative Study of the Ethics of Christine M. Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre by Zander, Michael Christopher
Georgia State University
ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University
Philosophy Theses Department of Philosophy
7-18-2008
A Comparative Study of the Ethics of Christine M.
Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre
Michael Christopher Zander
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses
Part of the Philosophy Commons
This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Philosophy at ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Philosophy Theses by an authorized administrator of ScholarWorks @ Georgia State University. For more information, please
contact scholarworks@gsu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Zander, Michael Christopher, "A Comparative Study of the Ethics of Christine M. Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre." Thesis, Georgia
State University, 2008.
https://scholarworks.gsu.edu/philosophy_theses/45
 A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE ETHICS OF CHRISTINE M. 
KORSGAARD AND JEAN-PAUL SARTRE 
by 
MICHAEL C. ZANDER 
 
Under the Direction of Sebastian Rand 
ABSTRACT 
     Christine M. Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre both locate the source of ethical normativity in 
human reflective consciousness.  Korsgaard’s claims that human beings are essentially rational, 
and that our rational nature is an adequate source of ethical content.  Sartre argues that a 
conception of human nature this minimal is insufficient to provide ethical content, and that we 
must look to our particular projects and identities to provide moral content.  I will argue that 
Sartre is correct that a view of human nature this minimal is inadequate to generate moral 
content, but that because Sartre is unable to demonstrate how norms based contingent projects 
and identities can produce universally binding ethical norms, his theory also fails.  The failure of 
both projects illustrates the weakness of a conception of ethics as universal obligation because it 
fails by its own standard to produce it goal of universally binding ethical norms with content.   
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 1 
I.  Introduction 
§ 1. The Content Problem    
     Christine M. Korsgaard and Jean-Paul Sartre both claim that human beings are the sources of 
normativity as the creators of moral norms.  Using Kant’s ethics of autonomy as a starting point 
Korsgaard and Sartre develop similar arguments that consistency requires we regard human 
beings as inherently valuable since human beings are the source of value itself.  The principal 
difference between Korsgaard and Sartre is that Korsgaard bases her ethical theory on a universal 
conception of human nature that is the same regardless of gender, historical period, social class, 
culture, race, and so forth, treating these differences as inessential where ethics is concerned.  
Sartre rejects the idea of a universal human nature transcending contingent circumstances in 
favor of an ethical theory that takes into account the ways in which particular identities and 
contexts define the interactions between situated reflective consciousnesses.  Deploying Sartre’s 
insights on the importance of the circumstances of moral choice and the role of particular 
identities in ethics, my goal will be to demonstrate that Korsgaard’s theory is susceptible to the 
criticism often made of Kantian ethics that it is too formal and unable to generate ethical content.  
Following that, I will argue that though Sartre’s approach represents an improvement over 
Korsgaard’s in terms of solving the content problem, in the end Sartre’s own ethics is also unable 
to generate universally binding moral content. 
     I will present both theories as attempts to solve the content problem ascribed to Kantian 
ethics, and evaluate them in that regard in comparison with each other.  Kantian ethics is often 
criticized for being purely formal and lacking content.  Kantian ethics gives us the abstract form 
of obligation, that I ought to do X as a means to Y, with X being some action leading to some 
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end Y.  Because Kantians argue that obligations must be categorical, that is they must hold for 
all persons in all possible circumstances, Kantian ethics must be both extremely general and 
abstract to cover all possible situations.  The complaint is that as a result Kantian ethics fails to 
adequately designate which actions I ought to take and which ends I ought to pursue.  The 
problem is thus explaining how we go from the universal form of obligation to particular 
obligations sufficiently specific to guide our actions in concrete circumstances.    
     Korsgaard’s theory is rooted in her conception of our shared human identity as rational 
animals, and that this most general identity is the foundation of universal moral norms that 
transcend contingent circumstances.  Because human beings are rational animals who must 
reflectively endorse their impulses in order to act autonomously, normativity arises out of the 
need for human reflective consciousness to have norms to guide actions.  Korsgaard ties 
normativity to identities, and claims that our various identities give rise to binding obligations 
that may only be violated at the risk of harm to the integrity of those identities.  Though 
according to Korsgaard all identities provide norms, particular identities are too contingent to 
serve as the foundation for ethical norms.  Korsgaard claims that ethical norms must be 
categorical, meaning that they must hold for all persons in all possible situations, and so she must 
base ethical normativity on an identity common to all persons.  That identity is our most general 
human identity.   
     The challenge for Korsgaard is to demonstrate that this most general of human identities 
provides sufficient content to guide our specific moral choices, while simultaneously presenting 
a plausible explanation for why our more particular identities may not serve as a basis for ethical 
obligations.  Korsgaard’s conception of human nature must be broad enough to encompass all of 
humanity in order to provide the general moral criteria she needs, and yet must be specific 
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enough to guide ethical choices in concrete situations.  Korsgaard must justify why, though she 
ascribes normativity to identities such as mother, friend, or citizen, it is only to our identity as 
human beings that is a proper source of ethical norms.  And having rejected the specific 
obligations tied to such particular identities as a source of moral content, she must demonstrate 
that obligations based on this most general identity are not so formal that they lack moral content 
sufficient to guide moral choice in actual practice. 
     Sartre denies that there is a universal human identity that can serve as the basis for ethics, 
instead arguing that because human beings have no fixed nature that precedes their existence, 
ethics is fundamentally the project of creating a meaning and a value for humanity.  For Sartre 
the source of normativity is also human reflective consciousness, but because there is no 
universal human nature transcending the particular identities and circumstances of individuals, 
each human being creates an image of what humanity should be through their actions.  Sartre 
claims that freedom is the universal human value that is the source of all other values, but as an 
abstract value it is not sufficient to yield moral content outside of particular circumstances.  
Because moral choice always takes place within a particular context, Sartre argues that moral 
norms must take contingent circumstances into account if they are to be specific enough to guide 
our actions.  Freedom as a value lacks content until we fill it in through particular lived choices.  
It is thus only through the concrete and contingent projects of situated individuals that the 
universal value of freedom generates moral content. 
     The challenge for Sartre is to explain how universal moral obligations are possible without a 
universal conception of human nature to serve as a foundation for ethics.  If we are not all 
fundamentally the same, with our sameness serving as the ground for shared ethical obligations, 
then Sartre must provide some other foundation for ethical obligations that is both universal and 
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binding.  Sartre does not want to reduce ethics to a purely individual matter that is nothing more 
than an expression of personal preference, but to avoid this outcome Sartre needs a shared value 
that holds for all human beings, regardless of their circumstances, to serve as a basis for ethics.  
Sartre claims that this shared universal value is freedom, but he must explain how freedom as a 
norm can generate universally binding ethical content. 
     The problem is thus to develop an ethical theory that is able to generate ethical norms that are 
both universally binding and specific enough to serve as a guide in making concrete moral 
choices.  Korsgaard stresses the universal foundation of ethics in a shared human nature as a 
necessity for categorical moral obligations.  Sartre stresses the importance of context and the 
situated particularity of individuals as necessary for generating content specific enough to guide 
moral choice in concrete circumstances.  I will argue that human nature as conceived by 
Korsgaard’s is too formal and abstract to generate specific ethical content.  I will also argue that 
though Sartre’s ethical theory more adequately takes into account the role of the particular in 
generating ethical content, that freedom as a universal value is also too formal to generate 
specific ethical content.  Though Sartre’s project is more successful than Korsgaard’s in that it 
both more clearly grasps the limitations of an ethics of abstract obligation and the importance of 
context and the particular in generating ethical content, in the end I will claim that both theories 
are unable to overcome the Kantian content problem because they are unable to overcome the 
limitations of a conception of ethics as universal obligation. 
 
 
 
 5 
§ 2. Methodology  
      I will begin by laying out Korsgaard=s theory in a general way to provide a basis for 
comparison with Sartre’s.  This will consist in a brief examination of the central aspects of 
Korsgaard’s theory as explicated in The Sources of Normativity.  I will then lay out some 
Hegelian criticisms of Kant’s ethics, and argue that Korsgaard’s ethical theory is also susceptible 
to these criticisms.  I will examine Kant’s ethics proper only as far as necessary to demonstrate 
the applicability of the Hegelian criticisms of Kant to Korsgaard.  Overall, I will attempt to focus 
as much as possible on the unique aspects of Korsgaard’s version of Kantian ethics, as they have 
interesting parallels to Sartre’s own approach to solving the content problem. 
     I will then lay out the central features of Sartre’s early ethics, concentrating on his critique of 
Kantian ethics in Existentialism and Humanism and the posthumously published Notebooks For 
An Ethics. 1  Presenting a definitive ethical theory is impossible where Sartre is concerned, as 
Sartre never completed the ethical project the Notebooks were intended to become.2  Sartre 
abandoned this project as too individualistic and idealistic, meaning that it was too abstract, 
formal, and Kantian.3  Sartre’s ethical thinking underwent further revisions and developments 
following the publication of the Critique of Dialectical Reason, where Marxism become a more 
dominant thread in his ethical thought.4  My interest for the purposes of this thesis is primarily 
with Sartre’s critical engagement with Kantian ethics, and the implications that his criticisms of 
Kant have for Korsgaard’s modified version of Kantian ethics.  For this reason I will confine 
                                                          
1 Though Sartre’s early ethical project remains uncompleted, the materials available are sufficient to present an 
approximation of Sartre’s theory through reconstruction of the above mentioned texts.  It is perhaps best to term this 
theory Sartrean, rather than explicitly Sartre’s, due to the extensive interpretation necessary by both various Sartre 
scholars and myself to draw out this theory.  For simplicity’s sake and because of my belief that this theory is 
generally what Sartre had in mind, I will continue to refer to it as Sartre’s theory. 
2 Anderson, Thomas C., Sartre’s Two Ethics: From Authenticity to Integral Humanity. (Chicago: Open Court, 
1993), p. 43. Cited hereafter as TE. 
3 TE, p. 87. 
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myself almost entirely to Sartre’s early ethics, which presents a detailed critical encounter with 
Kant’s ethical thought.  I will mention Sartre’s later Marxist ethics only briefly in order to 
demonstrate that Sartre himself thought his early ethics was still too abstract and formal, and to 
show that the initial moves he made in his early ethics towards the concrete were pushed further 
in that direction in his later ethics.  
     Following a general description of Sartre’s early ethics, I will begin a comparison of both 
Korsgaard’s and Sartre’s positions on key issues.  Through a comparative analysis of the two 
theories I will draw out the role that universal human nature and particular identities play within 
their shared framework of an ethics based on human reflective consciousness.  Next I will argue 
that though Sartre’s emphasis on the importance that situatedness plays in ethics presents a 
substantial improvement over Korsgaard’s more abstract approach, Sartre’s theory is still 
susceptible to the charge of Kantian formalism.  Finally, I will suggest that an ethics based on 
universal obligation will likely always be susceptible to this problem, and that Sartre’s attempt at 
solving it points to the necessity of a fuller view of what it means to act morally within a 
situation in order to generate an ethics with adequate moral content for practical application.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
4 TE, p. 88. 
 7 
II.  Korsgaard’s Ethics    
§ 1.  Korsgaard’s Model of Autonomy 
     Korsgaard explains autonomy, or the freedom of the will, in terms of what she calls reflective 
endorsement.  Korsgaard claims that for a will to be free it must be self-directed, which is to say 
it must legislate for itself, or provide rules for its own actions.  If desires, impulses, or reasons 
exterior to the will were what caused the will to act it would not be free, but instead determined 
by these external causes.  The autonomous will must thus be able to form principles for itself by 
which to test whether an impulse is an acceptable reason for action.  Korsgaard explains: “Each 
impulse as it offers itself to the will must pass a kind of test for normativity before we can adopt 
it as a reason for action.”5  Because human consciousness is essentially reflective “we human 
animals turn our attention on to our own perceptions and desires themselves, on to our own 
mental activities, and we are conscious of them.”6  Self-consciousness leads to a need for 
normativity “for our capacity to turn our attention to our own mental activities is also a capacity 
to distance ourselves from them, and to call them into question.”7  We no longer act 
automatically on our desires and impulses as reflective distance calls into question whether we 
should act upon them, whether we should reflectively endorse them as acceptable motivations for 
action. 
     Legitimate motivations for the will to act are reasons, or as Korsgaard defines it, “The 
normative word ‘reason’ refers to a kind of reflective success.”8  We have an impulse to act, but 
we do not do so automatically because the reflective distance created by the structure of human 
                                                          
5 Christine M. Korsgaard, The Sources of Normativity. Edited by Onora O=Neill. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University. Press, 1996), p. 91. Hereafter cited as SN. 
6 SN, p. 93. 
7 SN, p. 93. 
8 SN, p. 93. 
 8 
consciousness calls the impulse into question.  The impulse must be evaluated against some 
norm or standard to determine whether it can pass the test of reflective endorsement, and if it 
does we have a reason to act.  But by what standard do we evaluate impulses to determine 
whether they qualify as reasons for action, and through what process does successful reflective 
endorsement occur?  This is the question Korsgaard will attempt to address. 
     Korsgaard, following Kant, uses the concepts of law and causality as the basis for her 
explanation of how reflective endorsement occurs.  Korsgaard lays out Kant’s position as 
follows:  “He defines a free will as a rational causality which is effective without being 
determined by an alien cause.  Anything outside of the will counts as an alien cause, including 
the desires and inclinations of the person.  The free will must be entirely self-determining.  Yet, 
because the will is a causality it must act according to some law or other”.9  Reasons or 
motivations to act must be endorsed by the will through a reflective process thereby making 
them the will’s own, and since a will as a causality must be guided by a law, some rule or 
principle must be used by the will to evaluate impulses and determine whether they count as 
acceptable motivations for action.   
     A principle or rule is thus needed for the process of reflective endorsement to proceed, but the 
principle must be one the will gives to itself if the will is to remain free of external control.  
Korsgaard explains, “Since reasons are derived from principles, the free will must have a 
principle.  But because the will is free, no law or principle can be imposed on it from outside.  
Kant concludes that the will must be autonomous: that is, it must have its own law or 
principle.”10  This is the case because “until the will has a law or principle, there is nothing from 
                                                          
9 SN, p. 97. 
10 SN, p. 98. 
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which it can derive a reason.”11  Once a law or principal has been chosen the process of 
reflective endorsement becomes a matter of producing reasons from principles, in essence 
making the impulses a cause of action for ourselves by acknowledging that they are compatible 
with our principles and thus acceptable motivations for action. 
     The question raised at this point then becomes, “What principle should I choose for myself?”  
Korsgaard’s initial answer to what principle a free will must choose is found in the particular 
formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative known as the Formula of Universal Law:  “The 
categorical imperative, as represented by the Formula of Universal Law, tells us to act only on a 
maxim which we could will to be a law.”12  That is to say, we should choose a principle or 
maxim that we would be willing to have hold universally for everyone, one that we would be 
willing to have as a universal law governing everyone’s actions.  This is a formal constraint 
imposed by the nature of willing, according to Kantian sense of laws as universal.  The will 
requires a law to act, and because all laws are universal they should be equally binding on all 
rational beings.     
     This formulation of the categorical imperative does not provide specifics as to the content of 
the law to be chosen, but merely requires that it be in the form of a law.  The Formula of 
Universal Law, which Korsgaard refers to as the categorical imperative, “merely tells us to 
choose a law.  Its only constraint on our choice is that it has the form of a law.  And nothing 
determines what the law must be.  All that it has to be is a law.”13 The Formula of Universal Law 
recognizes the formal structural requirement that the will as a causality must act in accordance 
with a law.  But something more is needed for reflective success because reflective endorsement 
requires normative content that is specific enough to guide our actions in concrete situations.  
                                                          
11 SN, p. 98. 
12 SN, p. 98. 
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Something is required beyond the formal structure of a law required for willing, as some 
criterion is needed to distinguish moral actions from immoral ones. 
      Because innumerable principles fit the formal requirements necessary to count as laws, the 
categorical imperative has often been criticized for providing no specific moral content.  
Korsgaard acknowledges that any law is universal, and that because of this the categorical 
imperative allows for widely divergent principles to serve as a basis for action: 
If the law is the law of acting on the desire of the moment, then the agent will treat each desire as a reason, 
and her desire will be that of a wanton.  If the law ranges over the agent’s whole life, then the agent will be 
some sort of egoist.  It is only if the law ranges over every rational being that the resulting law will be the 
moral law.14 
 
To state this in a way that is perhaps clearer, there are various principles that a person could will 
as a universal law without violating the formal constraints of the Formula of Universal Law.  If a 
person wills that everyone should follow the principle that each of their desires is a reason to act, 
they have willed the universal law of impulsiveness, or the law of the wanton.  If a person wills 
the principle that everyone should act only on those desires that respect their own humanity but 
without consideration for the humanity of others they have willed the universal law of the egoist.  
And if a person wills the principle that everyone should act only on those desires that respect all 
people’s humanity, they will have willed the moral law.  All that is required of the principle is 
that it be in the general form of a law, and a wide variety of principles meet the formal constraint 
of generality.    
     Korsgaard is looking for something more than limited formal constraints described above.  
Her aim is to demonstrate that we should choose a principle with moral content.  Korsgaard 
believes we are obligated to choose the moral law as our principle.  For this demonstration she 
believes another of the formulations of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity, is 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
13 SN, p. 99. 
14 SN, p. 99. 
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required.  A free will is the first requirement of reflective success, but it is not enough by itself; 
reflective success also requires acting in accordance with an ethically normative principle, or the 
moral law. 15   
     Korsgaard explains: “Kant thought that we could test whether a maxim could serve as a law 
for the Kingdom of Ends by seeing whether there was any contradiction in willing it to be a law 
which all rational beings could agree to act on together.”16  The Kingdom of Ends was Kant’s 
way to designate the community of all rational beings.  Kant believed that any free will 
reasoning correctly would come to the same conclusions, and therefore all rational wills would 
necessarily develop the same principle as a guide to their actions.  Korsgaard wants to present an 
updated set of arguments to demonstrate that we must accept the moral law based on a 
conception of human nature as essentially rational.  Her arguments do not depend on Kant’s 
concepts of pure reason or a priori principles, but rather on a description of human nature.  Kant 
thought human nature too contingent a basis for morality, but Korsgaard believes that by using 
human nature as the foundation for morality she can provide a less formal and abstract basis for 
ethics while retaining its universal quality.  This is the central project of The Sources of 
Normativity: establishing Kant’s ethics of obligation based on a naturalistic conception of human 
beings as rational animals. 
 
                                                          
15 Korsgaard in making a distinction between what she calls the formal law of a free will as represented by the 
Formula of Universal Law, and the more substantive moral law as represented by the Formula of Humanity.  Kant 
thought these two linguistic formulas were two ways of saying the same thing, and were in fact equivalent.  
Korsgaard departs from Kant in claiming that the different forms of the categorical imperative are not equivalent, 
but agrees that one of Kant’s formulations of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Universal Law is 
necessarily the law of a free will.  She claims that it is formal or lacking in content.  Another of Kant’s formulations 
of the categorical imperative, the Formula of Humanity, she claims does have moral content.  The former she now 
refers to as the categorical imperative, and the later she calls the moral law, though Kant himself would have 
considered both as versions of the categorical imperative.  The reason Korsgaard makes this distinction is that she 
believes the common criticism of Kantian ethics that it is purely formal and lacking in content comes from 
conflating the two formulations as the same principle, which she believes they are not.  The Formula of Universal 
Law is formal rather than substantive, but the Formula of Humanity has content. 
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§ 2.  Practical Identity and Normative Content 
     The normative claims of morality, as Korsgaard rightly observes, originate in self-
consciousness.  Initially, self-consciousness gives rise to self-identity: “The reflective structure 
of the mind is a source of ‘self-consciousness’ because it forces us to have a conception of 
ourselves.”17  The result is the formation of what Korsgaard terms a practical identity, “a 
description under which you find your life to be worth living and your actions to be worth 
undertaking.”18  This is not a single simple description of ourselves, but rather a complex set of 
identities formed through the various ways in which we make sense of who we are.  “You are a 
human being, a woman or a man, an adherent of a certain religion, a member of an ethnic group, 
a member of a certain profession, someone’s lover or friend, and so on.”19  Any of these various 
identities have built into them a degree of normative content, and the requirements of living up to 
norms of these identities are the basis of the normative obligations we place on ourselves.  That 
is to say, “All of these identities give rise to reasons and obligations.  Your reasons express your 
identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what that identity forbids.”20 
     Korsgaard addresses identity and the threat of loss of identity in terms of integrity.  She 
writes, “Integrity is oneness, integration is what makes something one.  To be a thing, one thing, 
a unity, an entity; to be anything at all: in the metaphysical sense, that is what it means to have 
integrity.  But we use that term for someone who lives up to his own standards.”21  To violate the 
unconditional obligations that arise out of our central conceptions of ourselves “is to no longer 
be able to think of yourself under the description under which you value yourself and find your 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
16 SN, p. 99. 
17 SN, p. 100. 
18 SN, p. 101. 
19 SN, p. 101. 
20 SN, p. 101. 
21 SN, p. 102. 
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life to be worth living and your actions to be worth undertaking.”22  If we violate the norms of 
our practical identities, then our conceptions of ourselves start to fragment and shatter, and this is 
the threat of not living up to the normative obligations built into the ways in which we conceive 
ourselves. 
     One might object, however, that our self-identity is not that fragile, and therefore obligations 
based on our practical identities are not that strong.  For example, what of the person who claims 
a few exemptions they are not entitled to on their tax returns, or who breaks the speeding laws 
although they know these things violate the norms of good citizenship?  Do these people really 
risk destroying their identities as citizens?  Korsgaard acknowledges “that you can stop being 
yourself for a bit and still get back home, and in cases where a small violation combines with a 
large temptation, this has a destabilizing effect on the obligation.  You may know that if you 
always did this sort of thing your identity would disintegrate…but you also know that you can do 
it just this once without any such result.”23  Identity need not fragment over minor lapses, or 
perhaps even major lapses if they are infrequent enough, as our practical identities are too stable 
to collapse that easily.  If we continuously violate the norms of our identities in minor ways, or 
commit major violations of those norms, then we will inevitably start to wonder if we are the 
type of person we once thought we were. 
     Another problem arises when different ways in which we value ourselves come into conflict, 
such as when being a good citizen by obeying the laws of our country would involve 
participating in an unjust law that violates our identity as human beings.  Korsgaard 
acknowledges “that some parts of our identity are easily shed, and, where they come into conflict 
                                                          
22 SN, p. 102. 
23 SN, p. 102. 
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with more fundamental parts of our identity, they should be shed.”24  Korsgaard uses the 
example that “a good soldier obeys orders, but a good human being doesn’t massacre the 
innocent.”25  In a situation like this a soldier would be right to disobey orders, that is, to place his 
human identity as more fundamental than his identity as a soldier.  Likewise, civil disobedience 
to unjust laws in order to end segregation places our identity as human beings before our identity 
as citizens. 
     But if we are looking for a principle to choose as the law of a free will, how are we to judge 
which of our practical identities are the most essential?  Korsgaard acknowledges that most of 
our identities are contingent and relative; for instance, we may be born into a family that is part 
of a particular religious sect, and we may at some point renounce this membership.  The norms 
of this identity do not hold for everyone, but rather only for the members of that sect, and we 
could abandon these norms.  Likewise the duties of citizenship in a particular nation may vary 
substantially from those of another nation, and by changing our citizenship, we would change 
our obligations.  Such contingent identities, though giving rise to norms, are unable to provide a 
stable basis for ethics.  They also provide no criteria for choosing between various identities 
where a moral conflict arises between them. 
     But Korsgaard argues there is one identity that we all share, one which is not contingent or 
local, that is also the foundation of all our other identities: our identity as human beings.  It is 
upon the norms of this identity that our acceptance of the moral law, the Formula of Humanity, 
as the principle of a free will is based.  By human identity Korsgaard means “a reflective animal 
who needs reasons to act and live.”26  Reflective endorsement depends on our practical identities 
as, “we endorse or reject our impulses by determining whether they are consistent with the ways 
                                                          
24 SN, p. 102. 
25 SN, p. 102. 
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in which we identify ourselves.”27 Because of our reflective nature, all of our practical identities 
are based on the human need for reasons for action as evaluated through reflective endorsement 
of impulses, and therefore all of our other identities are dependent on our foundational human 
identity.            
     Korsgaard rejects moral realism and the idea that the objects we choose as ends are intrinsic 
goods.  This is because “Were it not for our desires and inclinations – and for the various 
physiological, psychological, and social conditions which give rise to those desires and 
inclinations – we would not find their objects good.” 28  Because we are the source of all values, 
the objects we choose as ends have no inherent worth in themselves, but acquire value from us.  
As the source of all values, if anything is to be valued at all we must value ourselves.  To value 
anything else while not valuing the source of value itself would be inconsistent. Or as Korsgaard 
states it: “the value of humanity itself is implicit in every human choice…if there is such a thing 
as a reason for action – then humanity, as the source of all reasons and values, must be valued for 
its own sake.”29 
     So we see that Korsgaard’s claim is that we must value ourselves if we value anything, but 
how does this demonstrate that a free will must accept the moral law as our principle?  Because 
Korsgaard regards human nature as essentially rational, we must avoid contradiction if we are to 
retain our humanity.  Because of this if we value our own humanity as a source of values, then 
we must value the humanity of others as well.  That is, “Since I regard my humanity as a source 
of value, I must in the name of consistency regard your humanity that way as well.”30  Just as I 
am an end as a source of values, so also are other people ends in themselves, and thus they must 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
26 SN, p. 121. 
27 SN, p. 120. 
28 SN, p. 122. 
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be treated in accord with the moral law that I must treat them always as ends and never simply as 
means.  To do otherwise would be to contradict ourselves, and thereby to damage the integrity 
our own human identity. 
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III. The Formalism Objection 
     Kant’s ethics has often been criticized for being excessively abstract and lacking in specific 
moral content.  Kant’s claimed that the universal and formal was the essential in ethics, and that 
the particular or concrete was inessential.  This was because Kant thought that anything that was 
contingent would be too uncertain a basis for ethics.  A proper foundation for ethics would have 
to be categorical, which is to say it must hold for all persons regardless of circumstances.  But 
because an ethics that is abstract enough to cover any and all circumstances must necessarily 
lack specificity, it has been criticized as purely formal and lacking in content.  The objection is 
that Kantians must either be content with an ethics that is so abstract that it is inadequate to serve 
as a guide for actions in actual practice, or they must surreptitiously bring in content from the 
particular identities and circumstances which they have already rejected as inessential.  The 
critics claim that both Kant and his followers have in fact incorporated elements of the particular 
and contingent into their ethics in order to generate content, and in so doing they have 
contradicted themselves.  In this section I will first describe this objection to Kant’s own 
philosophy, and then suggest why it also applies to Korsgaard’s modified version of Kantian 
ethics. 
     This line of criticism, first put forward by Hegel, is developed ably by F. H. Bradley.  Bradley 
describes the goal of Kantian morality as the realization of the good will, which is a will that is 
free, autonomous, and universal.31  Bradley describes formality as the essential characteristic of 
the good will: “In formality we see they are all one.  I am autonomous only because I am free, 
free only because I am universal, universal only because not particular, and not particular only 
when formal.”32  The will is free, autonomous, and universal only because it is formal and not 
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determined by anything particular or contingent, but a will that is formal is also without content 
and empty.  To illustrate this point further Bradley notes the characteristics of a universal 
standard, which must be equally formal if it is to be categorical and hold regardless of any 
contingent circumstances:  
Such a standard is a form or it is nothing.  It is to be above every possible this or that, and hence can not be 
any this or that.  It is by being not this or that, that it succeeds in having nothing which is not common to 
every this and that.  Otherwise there would be something which would fall without its sphere; it would be 
only one thing among others, and so would no longer be a standard.  But that which can be common to 
everything is not matter or content, but form only.33 
 
To be universal, Kant’s standard must have a domain that covers every possible contingency, but 
in so doing it must not contain anything limiting in the form of particular content. 
     In formulating both a moral end and a moral standard that are beyond all particularity and 
contingency, Kant created an ethics that is both universal and empty of content.  If this were the 
totality of Kant’s ethics it would be both consistent and completely useless in concrete 
circumstances.  But as Bradley observes, “I am not mere form; I have an ‘empirical’ nature, a 
series of particular states of the ‘this me’, a mass of desires, aversions, inclinations, passions, 
pleasures, and pains, what we may call a sensuous self.  It is in this self that all content, all 
matter, all possible filling of the form must be sought.”34  As described by Korsgaard, Kantian 
ethics supplies content by running the particular impulses of our phenomenal selves through the 
formal test of non-contradiction, and rejecting any contradictory impulses brings our phenomenal 
self into accord with the model of the formal good will.  Where the formal self and the particular 
self come into conflict, the formal self must prevail if we are to be moral.  Or as Bradley 
describes it, “Morality is the activity of the formal self forcing the sensuous self.”35 
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     Kantian morality may be summed up as follows: “Do not contradict yourself, i.e. let all your 
acts embody and realize the principle of non-contradiction; for so only can you realize the formal 
will which is the good will.”36  The problem is that the formal will must transcend all particulars 
to meet Kant’s definitions of what it means for the will to be free, autonomous, and universal, 
and yet for the good will to have content it must be realized through our sensuous self.  But the 
sensuous self is the phenomenal self in space and time, and “the predominant character of 
existence in space and time is, in one word, its particularness, what is ordinarily called its 
concreteness, the infinitude of its relations.”37 
     This leads to the basic contradiction of Kantian morality, that for it to be practically useful it 
must provide content, and yet for it to be categorical it must remain formal and empty.  Or as 
Bradley describes it, “’Realize non-contradiction’ is the order.  But ‘non-contradiction’ = bare 
form; ‘realize’ = give content to: content contradicts form without content, and so ‘realize non-
contradiction’ means ‘realize a contradiction’.”38  If a Kantian is content to leave morality as a 
thing of the abstract and atemporal noumenal world, then they have a consistent but practically 
useless morality; if they wish to realize it in the phenomenal world of time and space, then they 
must give it content, and in trying to realize universal form through particular content they seek 
to bring about a contradiction. 
     It is likely this concern about explaining how it is possible produce a universal form with 
particular content, as much as developing a Kantian theory that is compatible with the prevailing 
naturalism of contemporary philosophy, that motivated Korsgaard to put forward a version of 
Kantian morality founded on a view of human beings as rational animals.  Kant rejected human 
nature as too contingent a basis for morality, but Korsgaard’s human identity theory presents a 
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novel approach to explaining how Kantian formalism generates particular moral content.  
Because it is founded on a naturalistic description of human nature Korsgaard’s version of 
Kantianism initially appears better suited to explaining how we may realize the formal good will 
within our phenomenal sensuous selves.  Placing a naturalistic yet universal conception of 
human nature as the foundation for morality presents the promise of retaining the generality 
characteristic of Kantianism while explaining how particular moral content that is useful in 
practical moral decision making is generated.   
     The problem is that the essential human identity that serves as the foundation for morality in 
Korsgaard’s theory is so abstract and general that it is as empty and formal as Kant’s description 
of the good will.  A human identity that is elastic enough to apply to every human being who has 
yet or will ever live, regardless of race, gender, ethnicity, class, historical situation, and so on is 
too general to generate moral content.39  And the particular identities that might generate 
particular moral content Korsgaard rejects as too contingent a basis to produce an adequately 
categorical Kantian morality.  Korsgaard has thus recreated the Kantian contradiction of trying to 
realize the formal as the particular by proposing a formal definition of human identity and then 
giving it content by attempting to realize it in individual human beings in all their particularity 
and concreteness.  The particular is secondary and must give way to the universal, but if the 
universal in all its formality is to have content it must depend on the particular to supply it.  And 
thus the particular becomes the essential, and Korsgaard must look to the particular identities she 
rejected as a source of moral content to provide it, or leave her ethics without content. 
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     To develop this idea further, consider this restatement by Bradley of his objection to Kantian 
morality:  
What duty for duty’s sake really does is first to posit a determination, such as property, love, courage, &c., 
and then to say that whatever contradicts these is wrong.  And, since the principle is a formal empty 
universal, there is no connexion between it and the content that is brought under it...Thus to get from the 
form of duty to particular duties is impossible.  The particular duties must be taken for granted, as in 
ordinary morality they are taken for granted.40 
 
Applying this objection to Korsgaard’s own example of a good soldier following orders, but a 
good human being not killing the innocent, we see the same pattern.  In this case, Korsgaard 
assumes the norm not to harm the innocent.  But to know what innocence means in this context 
is to assume the rules of warfare and the norms that dictate different treatment of combatants and 
civilians.  To say that a generic human being has moral duties is to say nothing other than that he 
must will in the form of a law, and it is only by incorporating particular identities that moral 
content can be produced.  Korsgaard asserts that the generic human identity is the foundation of 
moral values while our particular identities may not be while simultaneously assimilating the 
moral content that comes from the particular norms and practices associated with identities such 
as soldier and civilian. 
     Korsgaard necessarily must assume certain social practices and the values associated with 
them if she is to produce particular moral content, because what it means to treat someone as an 
end in the abstract is unclear.  This is why Korsgaard adopts the meaning of innocence above as 
it has been formed within the context of certain particular social practices and the norms 
associated with them.  What it means to treat someone as an end depends upon circumstances 
and particular identities, as an enemy combatant presumably has the same human identity that a 
civilian does, and some justification for treating them differently is required.  The soldier knows 
to treat an enemy soldier differently than a civilian, and what counts as “innocence” in this 
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situation, exactly because of the particular identities of the individuals involved.  But rather than 
acknowledging the role played by particular identities in providing norms in this case, Korsgaard 
instead unconvincingly characterizes them in terms of norms tied to the soldier’s human identity.  
Because Korsgaard insists morality is categorical and transcends any particular contingent 
circumstances, she has first reduced the particular to the inessential, and then through the 
backdoor borrowed moral content precisely from the particular identities and associated norms 
she rejected as unsuitable to provide a basis for morality.  Circumstances matter for ethics in a 
way that the Kantian determined to find a categorical rule beyond circumstances is unable to 
account for. 
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IV. Sartre’s Ethics  
§ 1. Abstract Norms Lack Content 
     Sartre’s early ethics starts from a position of agreement with the basic Kantian ethical insight 
that one should “never regard another as a means, but always as an end.”41 But, Sartre objects, 
“If values are too uncertain, if they are still too abstract to determine the particular, concrete case 
under consideration, nothing remains but to trust in our instincts.”42  Sartre is here accepting the 
Hegelian criticism that the formality of Kantian ethics leaves it empty of content, and as a result 
no obligations specific enough to guide particular moral choices are designated.  Because 
Kantian morality is too abstract to give specific moral content based on its formal guidelines 
alone, in the end all it can do is endorse or reject whatever arbitrary impulses, identities, and 
social practices it is confronted with based on the contingent circumstances of the individual.  In 
this way what the Kantian rejected as too contingent to act as the basis of morality becomes the 
source of moral content, and thus the essential in ethics.  Sartre’s goal is to retain the Kantian 
insight that we must respect others as ends, while avoiding the Kantian problem of being unable 
to explain in concrete terms what that means.  
     Sartre’s existentialist ethical theory attempts to avoids the charge of empty formalism leveled 
against Kantians by demonstrating how the universal nature of moral willing interacts with 
concrete circumstances to create moral values.  Elaborating on his views on Kantian ethics, 
Sartre writes the following: “Although the content of morality is variable, a certain form of this 
morality is universal.  Kant declared that freedom is a will both to itself and the freedom of 
others.  Agreed: but he thinks that the formal and universal suffice for the constitution of a 
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morality.  We think, on the contrary, that principles that are too abstract break down when we 
come to defining action.”43  Sartre thus agrees with Kantians that the form of morality, and of 
moral willing, is necessarily universal.  The problem is that because ethical “content is always 
concrete, and therefore unpredictable; it has always to be invented.”44  For example, it is easy 
enough to grant that treating someone as an end would mean not murdering them.  But not all 
killing is murder, and not killing to protect an innocent from a sociopath might in fact be 
wrongful, so a blanket universal rule to never kill anyone seems unworkable.  There is a 
difference between killing for profit and killing in self-defense, and in these differences there is 
exhibited a variable element in determining what counts as moral in a given situation that cannot 
be decided in the abstract.  At the same time, there is a danger of having normativity swallowed 
up by contingency if all actions are ethically equivalent because there is no non-relative context 
independent criterion through which a moral judgment can be made.  The challenge for Sartre is 
thus to find a way to explain how universal ethical form is expressed through particular ethical 
content in a way that retains normativity. 
§ 2. Human Nature as Formal 
     To understand Sartre’s ethical theory it is best to start with his rejection of the notion of a 
universal human nature that may serve as a foundation for moral norms.  Sartre does not accept 
the notion “that each man is a particular example of an universal conception, the conception of 
Man.”45  He then notes that “in Kant, this universality goes so far that the wild man of the woods, 
man in the state of nature and the bourgeois are all contained in the same definition and have the 
same fundamental qualities.”46  This view sees man’s essence as transcending any historical 
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epoch or particular circumstances.  All human beings, regardless of gender, race, nationality, or 
historical period are fundamentally the same.  Any differences between them are secondary, and 
where morality is concerned inessential.   
     Sartre’s ethics originates from the contrary position that in the case of human beings existence 
precedes essence.  Sartre writes: “Man first of all exists, encounters himself, surges up in the 
world – and defines himself afterwards.  If man as the existentialist sees him is not definable, it is 
because to begin with he is nothing.  He will not be anything until later, and then he will be what 
he makes of himself.”47  Individual persons come into the world without an essential nature that 
precedes their existence.  As a result, each person must form their own conception of what it 
means to be human. 
    Sartre sees this as a natural consequence of his atheism and rejection of metaphysical values.  
Sartre restricts his philosophy to the phenomenal world, and as a result he has no recourse to a 
supernatural creator to fashion man in his own image, and to thereby fill in the content of what it 
means to be human.  Traditionally, God conceived of as creator played the key role in ethics by 
providing man with a set nature to live in accordance with: 
When God creates he knows precisely what he is creating.  Thus, the conception of man in the mind of God 
is comparable to that of the paper-knife in the mind of the artisan:  God makes man according to a 
procedure and a conception, exactly as an artisan manufactures a paper-knife, following a definition and a 
formula.  Thus each individual man is the realization of a conception in the divine understanding.48 
 
But because the essence of each particular human being would already exist before they are born, 
their true nature is determined in advance, and any lack of coincidence between the particular 
man and the universal conception of man must be a failure of the individual to live up his true 
nature.  Man’s nature would therefore provide an objective criterion for ethical criticism of the 
individual who fails to conform to the universal conception of Man. 
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     But “if God does not exist there is at least one being whose existence comes before his 
essence, a being which exists before it can be defined by any conception of it.”49  That being, of 
course, is man.  With no creator to define human nature in advance, each person is left to form 
their own conception of what it means to be human.  And because the individual is forming a 
conception of humanity in general, this conception once formed is projected universally to all 
human beings.   
§ 3. Freedom and Normativity 
     The foundation of Sartre’s ethics is the human condition as defined by a formal human 
consciousness embodied in a concrete situation world.  Human consciousness is free because it is 
formal.  Because it is nothing by itself it represents a negative break with the causality of being.  
This break with being and causation provides the reflective room necessary to form an ideal 
image of the world as we think it ought to be, and to shape it accordingly.  Because being is 
indifferent to value, it must be human consciousness in its negativity that is the source of value.  
Our ability to imagine alternative states of being and value some of those states over others 
creates normativity.   
     Because human consciousness by itself is formal, it is empty without the world it reflects.  
Values are formed through formal freedom willing that certain concrete states of being should 
come to be instead of others.  Values are therefore a synthesis of human consciousness and its 
objects willed as ends.  These values are exemplified by our projects through which we try to 
realize our ideal image of the world by acting upon it.  While it is possible to form abstract 
principles based on the values we create through our actions, it is our concrete choices that Sartre 
believes should be the focus of ethics. 
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          Sartre does not offer a particular conception of human nature because his conception of the 
human subject as free consciousness embodied in the world is insufficient to provide one.  
Individual human beings find themselves in particular historical and cultural environments, and 
human formal freedom expresses itself in terms of its context such that there are many 
competing conceptions of human nature.  Because there is no given human nature that transcends 
all periods of human history and cultures, human beings are left to create an ideal image of 
humanity through their actions just as they create and idea image of the world.  Moral willing, 
being universal in its nature, requires that when we will something as a good for ourselves we 
also will as a good for others.  But because circumstances matter in ethics the moral norms that 
we create are willed as moral goods only for those in similar situations.  When we act we form 
an image of how all human beings should act in the same circumstances.  Our particular actions 
form examples for others to emulate, and we should act only as we would wish all other people 
to act in similar circumstances.  We, in effect, form an image of human nature as we would have 
it be through our concrete actions. 
     Sartre sees normativity as originating from human consciousness, and human freedom as the 
foundation of all values.  In Sartre’s philosophy consciousness plays a role similar to that played 
by the will in Kant’s philosophy: it is the source of freedom because of its negative break with 
being, but because it is formal it is lacking in content without the world it reflects.  Sartre 
therefore claims that moral willing, to have content, must be in the form of the willing of 
concrete ends in the world.  It is not enough to will general principles as these are too abstract to 
give concrete content, but instead we will our values in terms of the projects we carry out in the 
world.   
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     In order to illustrate this point, Sartre uses the example of the coward and the hero.  One 
could say the project of becoming a coward or a hero is the project of embodying the values of 
cowardice or heroism through an identity we create for ourselves through our actions.   Sartre 
explains, “The existentialist, when he portrays a coward, shows him as responsible for his 
cowardice…He is not like that on account of a cowardly heart or lungs or cerebrum, he has not 
become like that through his physiological organism; he is like that because he has made himself 
into a coward by his actions.”50  Sartre’s claim is that the acceptance of the total responsibility 
for what we become is a consequence of freedom that is not easy to face.  And it is no better for 
the hero than it is for the coward:   
If you are born cowards, you can be quite content, you can do nothing about it and you will be cowards all 
your lives whatever you do; and if you are born heroes you can again be quite content; you will be heroes 
all your life, eating and drinking heroically.  Whereas the existentialist says that that the coward makes 
himself cowardly, the hero makes himself heroic; and that there is always the possibility for a coward to 
give up cowardice and for the hero to stop being a hero.  What counts is the total commitment, and it is not 
by a particular case or particular action that you are committed altogether.51 
 
It is thus the continued commitment to a particular course of action, and the accumulation of 
actions over time, that makes one a coward or a hero, and the possibility always remains that one 
will abandon the prior commitment in favor of a new project. 
§ 4.  The Source of Values 
       Sartre’s central claim is that all individuals, being free, are forced to invent morality for 
themselves.  Sartre argues that reflective consciousness requires that we must value something if 
we are to act at all.  But because the world does not contain values other than through man, we 
must create values rather than discovering them.  Reflective consciousness requires reasons to 
act.  If values are not to be discovered existing either a priori or as readymade entities in the 
world, then our only option is to create values for ourselves. 
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     Sartre writes, “A platonic Good that would exist in and by itself makes no sense…It would be 
contradictory as an aberrant synthesis of being and ought-to-be.”52  This is a result of Sartre’s 
view of being as a pure positive plenitude.  To speak of the Good is to speak of how things 
should be, as opposed to how they are, and this makes no sense with regard to something that can 
only be what it is.  The ought-to-be of the Good only has meaning for a being that is capable of 
being what it is not, that is to say, man.  Which is to say that normativity enters the world 
through human beings; we are the sources of normativity.  
     Sartre’s belief that human beings are the sources of normativity is revealed in the following 
assertion, “Every act, in effect, presupposes a separation and a withdrawal of the agent in relation 
to the real and an evaluating appraisal of what is in the name of what should be.  So man has to 
be considered as the being through which the Good comes into the world.”53  The Sartrean 
conception of the Good is not that of a judgment as to the logical consistency of principles, but 
rather, as a positing of what ought-to-be as opposed to what is.  To choose the Good is thus 
fundamentally to create the world as we would have it be, to transcend Being as it currently is.  
This is because, “Subjectivity finds its meaning outside of itself in this Good that never is and 
that it perpetually realizes...For it is always through the transcendent that I define myself.”54 
     And because of the general character of moral willing, not only do we define ourselves 
through the transcendent Good we will, but through it we also form a conception of Man.  In so 
doing we will that our Good also be the Good of mankind generally, and so will that others also 
act to realize our choice of the Good.  Sartre explains, “The universal structure of the Good is 
necessary as that which gives it its transcendence and its objectivity.  To posit the Good in doing 
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it is to posit Others as having to do it.  We cannot escape this…Not only is it my ideal, it is also 
my ideal that it become the ideal of others.  But its universality is not de facto, it is de jure like its 
other characteristics.”55  The Good must be willed universally as values arising from our freedom 
as expressed through our concrete projects.  Our creative moral act is thus simultaneously the 
creation of an ought for ourselves, and the universal willing of an ought for others.  But because 
our version of the Good originates from us our choice of particular projects, it is neither given in 
advanced or permanent.  Rather, the Good is provisional in that it depends on the continuation of 
the particular projects that define it. 
§ 5. Freedom as the Foundational Value 
     Not all values that we might will are equally moral, however, so to avoid relativism Sartre 
must offer some criteria through which to judge which values are morally acceptable.  Sartre 
does so by offering a foundational value in light of which other values may be evaluated, and 
that value is freedom.  Because freedom is the source of all values, it is essential for the very 
possibility of morality.  For Sartre values are fundamentally about a break from what is in favor 
of what ought to be, and it is freedom that provides this break.  Sartre depicts human reflective 
consciousness as a negative break with being that allows for the imagining of alternative ways in 
which things could be.  Since values are not to be found as intrinsic properties of things 
themselves, but are instead created through our choice of certain states of being over others, our 
freedom to imagine and pursue alternative states of being is the source of all values.  Without 
human consciousness, and the freedom that its negative break with being creates, there would be 
only facts and not values.  Freedom must therefore be regarded as the foundational value from 
which all others originate.   
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     Sartre argues that because human freedom is the source of all values, that we must value our 
own freedom if we are to value anything.  And because we value freedom as the source of all 
values, we would be inconsistent if we valued only our own freedom and not the freedom of 
others.  Sartre writes, “When I recognize, as entirely authentic, that man is a being whose 
existence precedes his essence, and that he is a free being who cannot, in any circumstances, but 
will his freedom, at the same time I realize that I cannot not will the freedom of others.”56  But if 
human freedom is the source of all values, how is Sartre able to offer any principle that could 
restrict freedom by setting up moral norms?  Sartre has been criticized for incorporating the 
principle of consistency in arguing that if we will our own freedom we must will the freedom of 
others, as if freedom precedes all other values then consistency or non-contradiction would be 
unable to limit it.  This “must” is a normative restriction on freedom that Sartre must justify. 
     As Linda Bell observes, “Those who affirm self-contradictions remove themselves from the 
framework of human communication.”57  While we all have some capacity to contradict 
ourselves in limited ways, to abandon consistency as a value entirely would make meaningful 
communication impossible.  The rules of language and the practice of reason giving are built 
upon non-contradiction, and would break down without the value of consistency.  And as 
Anderson points out, in any case, “it is impossible to accept reasons in support of valuing logical 
consistency or rationality without, in effect, begging the question!  Reasons will have value, and 
so be persuasive, only to one who has already freely chosen to value rationality.”58  The converse 
of this is that it would make no sense for someone who had rejected consistency as a value to 
demand reasons to adopt it, as the demand itself depends on an acceptance of the value being 
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rejected.   There is, in effect, no way to prove the value of consistency without first valuing 
consistency. 
     Anderson notes that Sartre “seems (correctly, in my opinion) to suggest that it would be 
logically inconsistent, and inconsistent with human reality, especially human reality, to desire a 
meaningful existence and not first and foremost value the human freedom that alone is the source 
of all meaning and value.”59  But for this argument to hold one must accept consistency as a 
value, but it is impossible to argue that one should do so in a non-question begging way.  The 
answer Sartre would offer is that while theoretically it is possible to abandon consistency as a 
value entirely, and impossible to prove its value without begging the question, in actual practice 
it is unlikely to be a real possibility because it is so foundational to language and communication.  
Consistency is simply necessary if we are going to give reasons at all.  And once Sartre has 
established freedom and consistency as the foundation basis of morality, he is able to 
demonstrate that just as we must will our own if we are to value anything at all, so must we also 
will the freedom of others. 
§ 6. The Formalism Objection Redux 
     A more serious objection to Sartre’s early ethics is that an ethics based on abstract freedom is 
as formal as the Kantian morality he criticizes.  Sartre is not advocating a only a formal freedom, 
one like Kant’s freedom of the will, but also concrete freedom.  David Detmer uses the following 
examples to explain the difference between formal freedom and concrete freedom: “The slave, 
the unemployed worker, and the prisoner are free in one sense of the word, that designated by 
such expressions as ‘freedom of choice’ and ‘ontological freedom,’ but relatively unfree in 
another sense, that designated by ‘freedom of obtaining’ and ‘practical freedom.’”60   For 
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example, we could say that because of human reflective consciousness the prisoner locked away 
in his cell is as free to will that he take a walk in the park as jailor at his work.  Both have a 
formal freedom to give meaning to their situations and will as they wish in accordance with the 
concrete restrictions on their freedom – imprisonment and employment obligations.  But Sartre is 
interested in not only the ontological freedom to will an end, which we might say is a necessary 
but not sufficient condition for ethics, but also in the practical freedom to obtain that end.  We 
need ontological freedom in order for moral responsibility to exist, and we need moral 
responsibility as a foundation for ethics.  But for Sartre ethics must also encompass concrete 
freedom, as a formal freedom that treats the prisoner or the slave as equally free to the jailor or 
the master would be nothing but a cruel hoax.   
     Ethics should start from the position of acknowledging that the ontological freedom of the 
prisoner and the jailor may be equivalent, but their level of practical freedom is drastically 
different.  A concrete ethics based on freedom should be concerned with increasing the practical 
freedom of all persons, as for Sartre ontological freedom is purely formal in that it exists equally 
for everyone regardless of circumstances by virtue of human reflective consciousness.  And it is 
the distinction between these two types of freedom that form the basis for moral criticism in 
Sartre’s ethics. 
     For Sartre, ontological freedom is the formal freedom that removes us from the determinism 
of causality, and because it is formal it is also absolute in that it transcends any situation.  Detmer 
explains: “Any consciousness, no matter what its situation, is absolutely free in the sense that it 
is not its situation—that, through its nihilating behaviors, it can separate itself from all that is 
external to it, and from whatever might attempt to ensnare or enslave it, and, in so doing, 
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disentangle itself from the chain of causal determinism.”61  This freedom is in some sense 
outside of any situation because, like Kant’s freedom of the will, it is able to transcend any 
particular situation.  “I am absolutely free because no situation can completely determine how I 
will interpret that situation, what project I will form with respect to that interpretation, or how I 
will act in attempting to carry out that project.”62 
     The problem though is exactly that an abstract freedom of this sort is outside of any situation 
and in that sense absolutely free, but we as concrete human beings are limited by the facticity of 
our situations.  As Detmer notes, “The prisoner is always free to attempt an escape or to adopt an 
attitude of resignation, but not simply to make the prison bars disappear without effort or risk.”63  
Human beings consist of a transcendent reflective consciousness that is embodied in a concrete 
situation that places real limits on the exercise of our freedom.  The ideal for Sartre is to make 
our formal freedom real concretely through the increase of the practical freedom “to obtain our 
freely (in the ontological sense) chosen ends.64  It is our ontological freedom that makes practical 
freedom a possibility in “that a being who lacks the power of conscious choice cannot be 
enslave, nor can the freedom of such a being be enhanced or diminished…because one cannot 
alter the quantity of a quality which is not present in the first place.”65 But because we are 
concrete beings ontological freedom is insufficient to the realization of our ends.  If we are to 
realize those ends we will need to realize them concretely in our situations, and this requires 
practical freedom to carry out our projects. 
     If we combine this distinction between ontological freedom and practical freedom with 
Sartre’s argument that we must value both our own freedom and the freedom of others, we see 
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the Sartrean ethic emerging.  For Sartre to treat others as ends means to act so that we increase 
their practical freedom, and thereby enable them to realize their freely chosen ends.  We see here 
that the charge leveled against Sartre that he is a radical subjectivist, that any freely chosen end is 
permissible as all that matters is that it is freely chose, is not a correct representation of his 
position.  Those actions that increase human practical freedom are moral, while those that limit 
human practical freedom are immoral.  When “inventing” ethics this criterion is meant to 
provide a basis for making judgments that some actions are moral while others are immoral. 
     There is another sense in which Sartre’s ethics could be argued to be formal, and that is the 
objection that Sartre’s version of what it means to treat people as ends is just as formal as the 
Kantian notion.  Anderson observes that “to say we should value the concrete freedom of others 
is to offer rather thin advice…Sartre offers no guidelines or specific recommendations as to 
whose concrete freedoms are to be supported and those who are not.”66  Though “Sartre clearly 
manifests his support for the oppressed and alienated, rather than their powerful oppressors,” 
Sartre fails to “justify his preferential option for the oppressed.”67  We might say that we should 
act against those who try to limit human freedom while we support those who act to expand 
human freedom, but again without obligations specific enough to guide actions in concrete cases 
we are trapped in the Kantian bind of not knowing what actions to take based on incredibly 
vague notions of abstract obligation.   
     What does it mean, exactly, to advance human practical freedom?  Sartre defines it in terms 
of socialism.  Sartre claims that the foundational project we should all choose is “the ultimate 
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end which is always the founding of a reign of concrete freedom.”68  That is, the foundational 
project is bringing about concretely his own version of the Kantian kingdom of ends: “a society 
without classes, therefore without violence, without lies, for a free mankind.”69  But “few 
particulars are offered about how a classless city of ends could be brought into being in our 
concrete historical situation, nor how it might function politically and economically.”70  Sartre 
seems to assume a particular form of ethics rather than either describing it or justifying it.  What 
we see here looks like the familiar pattern of assuming a conventional ethics, in this case a 
socialist one, to provide particular content to the abstract notion of obligation.  Sartre, though 
importantly recognizing the importance of realizing values concretely, seems to have run up 
against the same Kantian dilemma of either presenting an ethics that is universal but too abstract 
to guide our concrete actions, or having to questionably assume some particular ethics in order to 
incorporate moral content into the form of abstract universal obligations.  
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IV. The Role of the Universal and the Particular in Ethics 
§. 1. The Problem 
      When comparing the two theories, the similarities between the arguments offered for valuing 
others out of respect for consistency are striking.  Both Sartre and Korsgaard locate the source of 
values in human reflective consciousness, and both argue that consistency requires that we value 
ourselves and others as the source of values.  It’s not entirely surprising that Sartre and 
Korsgaard would have close parallels in their ethical outlooks considering that their ethical 
projects are similar: both wish to retain the Kantian insight that ethics is founded on valuing 
ourselves and others as ends, while avoiding falling into Kantian formalism by offering ethical 
theories grounded in human experience.  The challenge for both Korsgaard and Sartre is thus 
essentially the same: to explain how moral content is generated from a combination of universal 
form and particular facts about the world.   
      Their responses to this challenge differ primarily because of their varied emphasis on the 
importance of universality and particularity.  Korsgaard’s answer is to stress the primacy of 
universal form where ethics is concerned, and to treat particular facts as too contingent to be a 
basis for ethics.  For Korsgaard if universal form and particular facts are in conflict, then the 
particular must give way to the universal.  Sartre takes the position that universal form is 
necessary, but not sufficient, to constitute an ethics.  For Sartre universal form is empty without 
concrete facts, and because ethics always takes place within a situation, ethics must take account 
of how circumstances shape ethical choices.  Sartre argues that moral content requires the 
application of universal form to concrete facts, and that if the particular is necessary to generate 
moral content then it is inconsistent to treat it as inessential. 
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       In this section I will compare the general outlines of the two ethical theories in terms of 
human nature and universal and particular identities.  I will do so through a series of examples 
that illustrate how the stress on either the universal or particular play out in terms of the link 
between identity and obligation.  Korsgaard’s stress of the importance of a universal human 
identity to ethical normativity as opposed to Sartre’s rejection of a universal human nature as too 
formal to act as a basis for ethics supply an excellent means to examine the differences to their 
approaches in more detail.  In addition, their treatment of particular identities as a source of 
obligations presents an opportunity to see how they both might propose to incorporate particular 
norms into a universal framework. 
     Korsgaard retains a Kantian notion of ethics as necessarily categorical, which means it must 
transcend contingent circumstances and holding universally for all persons.  Korsgaard’s basis 
for morality is an Enlightenment concept of human nature as essentially rational.  Because our 
universal human nature is the source of moral norms, Korsgaard claims that our contingent 
identities are ethically irrelevant.  Because of this focus on the abstract, Korsgaard has difficulty 
explaining adequately the role of the particular in ethics.   
     Sartre thinks that an ethics that is too abstract will be unable to provide adequate guidance in 
making concrete ethical choices, and develops a theory of what it means to will universally 
within concrete circumstances.  Sartre’s distrust of the abstract carries over into his views on 
humanity where he rejects a universal human nature that transcends history and culture, and 
instead argues that human nature is something that is continually being recreated through human 
actions.  In his view ethics must incorporate a respect for the contingency of human existence, 
which is not secondary or irrelevant, but central to ethics. 
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§ 2. Reasons and Obligations 
     Korsgaard claims that all norms arise from our identities, be they our universal human 
identity or particular contingent ones.  She divides these norms into moral ones, which are 
always based on our human identity, and non-moral ones based on our particular identities.  In 
addition she divides these norms into positive and negative norms.  Korsgaard describes them in 
this way: “Your reasons express your identity, your nature; your obligations spring from what 
your identity forbids.”71  Reasons are thus positive norms that tell us what actions ought to be 
done, and obligations are negative norms that tell us what actions ought not to be done.  
Korsgaard explains, “If reasons arise from reflective endorsement, then obligation arises from 
reflective rejection.”72 
     Korsgaard believes that moral norms must transcend any contingent circumstances or 
identities, and because she claims that moral norms arise from identities she needs a universal 
identity if she is to derive categorical norms.  This identity is our human identity, and because it 
is the only identity that transcends the contingency of particular individuals Korsgaard states that 
it is the only identity that generates moral norms.  Human identity as conceived by Korsgaard is 
essentially rational, and the primary value associated with this identity is non-contradiction.  
Because the only identity that is sufficiently universal to generate moral norms is our human 
identity, and the primary value associated with this identity is non-contradiction, we can say that 
the primary moral norm is that of non-contradiction.  Other norms based on our more particular 
identities are not a suitable basis on which to found moral norms because they lack the 
universality required for moral normativity.  Korsgaard’s ethical project is thus that of 
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demonstrating how the foundational moral norm of rational consistency is able to generate an 
ethics that avoids the content problem. 
     Now if we look at the norm of non-contradiction in terms of reasons and obligations, we find 
that it is insufficient to provide reasons for action.  We would never say that one ought to take 
some specific action merely because it is non-contradictory, and the form of non-contradiction 
does not recommend to us any specific actions to take.  The moral norm of non-contradiction 
gives us one obligation, to not contradict ourselves.  The whole of human morality is thus 
founded on the negative obligtation that we not contradict ourselves.  And because Korsgaard 
tells us “An obligation always takes the form of a reaction against a threat of a loss of identity,”73 
we may say that ethics primary concern is maintaining the integrity of our human identity as 
rational beings by avoiding contradiction.  
     Because the negative injunction to not contradict ourselves generates no positive reasons for 
action in the abstract, and does not rule out any particular action as contradictory by itself, non-
contradiction is devoid of content until applied to some particular impulse or action.  And the 
contradiction will take the form of obligation, that is one ought to do X in order to achieve Y.  
The end that Korsgaard says we are to pursue is that of treating human being always as ends and 
never merely as means, and any action or impulse that contradicts that obligation will be 
immoral.  We might say then that the one obligation tied to our human identity is the test of 
seeing whether an impulse or action conflicts with valuing humanity as an end in itself.  This 
gives rise to the formal test Korsgaard calls the moral law: “The moral law tells us to act only on 
maxims that all rational beings could agree to act on together in a workable cooperative 
system.”74   
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     The objection is that in the abstract the moral law is empty and purely formal, so if we are to 
derive any specific directives we must run our impulse through the formal test of moral 
obligation to see if they are morally permissible.  To apply this test we would universalize our 
actions such that we would imagine the outcome if all people acted as we propose to do.  If our 
proposed actions did not prove contradictory when universalized in terms of the moral law, we 
would have at least passed the test of reflective rejection.  Our impulse to action could then be 
regarded as a proper reason for action in that it did not violate our moral obligations.   
     Korsgaard can provide us with no moral criteria to guide us in deciding which impulses we 
should give priority to when we must choose between competing impulses that have passed the 
test of reflective rejection.  They are, it would seem, all morally acceptable having passed the test 
of reflective endorsement.  Presumably decisions between such competing impulses would be 
made based on non-moral values derived from contingent identities, with those actions furthering 
the identities we value most taking precedence over those we value least.75  But since all of our 
contingent identities are morally inessential, it would seem that any distinction made between 
morally permissible impulses based on them would be arbitrary from the perspective of morality.  
And because Korsgaard claims we are able to shed any of our contingent identities, we have no 
stable basis to decide between competing impulses that have passed the test of reflective 
rejection.  In effect, from a moral point of view, we are left to arbitrarily follow whatever 
morally equivalent impulse is the strongest at any given moment. 
     If all of our impulses require reflective endorsement, then we require a positive reason for 
acting on one impulse over others if we are to retain our autonomy.  This is because as reflective 
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beings we must endorse our impulses rather than having our actions determined by whatever 
impulse is the strongest at the moment.  A minimal negative test that rejects a certain subset of 
impulses as morally impermissible and then treats all morally permissible actions as equivalent 
would seem an insufficient basis for autonomy.  And because Korsgaard regards all of our 
particular identities as contingent, she has no principled way to justify acting on those morally 
permissible impulses that correspond to non-moral reasons.  Our autonomy in deciding between 
morally permissible reasons for action vanishes because all of our reasons for acting are based on 
contingent identities, and we have no meaningful justification for preferring one non-
contradictory identity over another since they are all optional and equivalent from the 
perspective of our one categorical identity.  Put another way, once an impulse passes the minimal 
threshold test Korsgaard has no principled means to judge which actions are preferable amongst 
those permissible choices.  Instead she has to leave it to either the strength of our impulses to 
guide our choices, or to an arbitrary choice of one contingent identity over another.  Simply 
stated, under Korsgaard’s theory, all of our reasons for action are in a deep sense arbitrary. 
§ 3. Human Nature 
   Sartre presented the example of a student coming to him with a moral dilemma as a means of 
illustrating the formality of Kantian ethics.  The student was faced with the choice of either 
staying at home to comfort his mother or leaving to join the free French forces to help liberate 
France.  As Sartre observes “he was hesitating between two types of morality; on the one side the 
morality of sympathy, of personal devotion and, on the other side, a morality of wider scope but 
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of more debatable validity.”76  Sartre’s student was presented with a concrete moral choice that 
was not answerable through a Kantian ethics of abstract obligation: 
The Kantian ethic says, Never regard another as a means, but always as an end.  Very well; if I remain with 
my mother, I shall be regarding her as an end and not as a means: but by the same token I am in danger of 
treating as means those who are fighting on my behalf; and the converse is also true, that if I go to the aid 
of the combatants I shall be treating them as the end at the risk of treating my mother as a means.77 
 
The moral law provided him with no principled way to decide whether he should to stay with his 
mother or join the resistance because in either case Sartre believes the student would be treating 
persons as ends, and this Sartre says is evidence of the formality of Kantian ethics.  If we do not 
have a definite enough positive description of what it means to treat persons as ends, then it is 
unclear how we should resolve moral dilemmas such as this one.  As a result of the lack of 
specificity about what it means to treat persons as ends, once we attempt to apply an ethics of 
abstract obligation to particular circumstances we run into problems of generating particular 
content just as Sartre’s student did.   
     Sartre would argue that  Korsgaard’s conception of human nature as rational self-reflection is 
similarly formal in that it provides no meaningful direction where concrete actions are 
concerned.  This conception of what it means to be human is hopelessly abstract, so of course it 
can give us no criteria to decide which of our impulses we should act on.  Sartre’s objection to 
Korsgaard’s model of human nature would be that abstract human nature that transcends any 
particular situation is nothing but an empty form waiting to be filled out through out actions.  For 
Sartre the starting-point of ethics is the realization that formal human nature cannot tell us what 
our actions ought to be.  Instead he argues that it is through our actions that we construct a model 
of human nature that has content.  The problem for Korsgaard is that for her formal human 
nature is not the starting point, but the whole story.  As a result all of our reasons for action are 
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by her own standard arbitrary, and she is unable to provide us with any binding concrete positive 
norms for action.  
     Sartre agrees with Korsgaard that morality starts with recognizing the subjectivity of the 
other, of recognizing that they are also conscious beings and not merely objects.  But Sartre 
would object that to act in accord with a formal conception of human nature is to present a claim 
without content, one that is merely formal, and therefore open to the same objections leveled 
against Kant.  Sartre would object that Korsgaard’s claims about human nature are too general 
and abstract to provide moral content, and that all she has done is provide the formal claim that 
we should value the subjectivity of others.  What value that subjectivity has must be worked out 
in the concrete through the lived experience of the individual. 
     Because historically man has taken such a divergent number of principles and ways of life as 
his own, a model of human nature that is broad enough to cover all of humanity has to be elastic 
to the point of empty formality to allow for such variation.  Sartre himself says that human 
beings are reflectively conscious, free, and embodied in the world.  But these facts about what it 
means to exist as a human being are too minimal to provide moral content by themselves.  
Sartre’s denial that an abstract human nature has content is not meant as a denial of the facticity 
of a shared human condition, but for him these general traits are too universal and abstract to 
provide adequate guidance in concrete situations.   
     Sartre claims that it is through formal freedom’s situatedness within a concrete context that 
moral norms with meaningful content are generated.  There are facts about us and our situations 
that are not optional in the way that Korsgaard portrays them, and it is in concrete objectivity of 
the situation that Sartre looks for a source of particular moral content.  Sartre’s emphasis on the 
concrete, and his recognition that the particular plays as important a role in making choices as 
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does the general or universal, presents the possibility that particular identities might be able to 
play a more important role in generating moral content that Korsgaard suggests.  But the problem 
remains that such identities lack the universality normally associated with ethics. 
     Sartre thus agrees with Korsgaard’s argument that we must value other human beings, but he 
would claim that we are still left to explain what that means in the concrete through our own 
particular lived experiences.  Application of Korsgaard’s principles would seem to require that 
we have some criterion to resolve conflicts between competing morally permissible reasons for 
actions based on contingent identities.  But for this we cannot rely on the contingent identities 
themselves since Korsgaard claims that they are all equally optional.  What might appear to us to 
be the identity with the highest priority at one point might very well be abandoned in favor of 
another at a later point, and so we are left with the problem of finding some stable identity on 
which to base such a criterion.  
     The formal conception of human nature embodied in our human identity offers no help, as at 
best it can rule out certain particular identities as contradictory and morally unacceptable.  But 
this only tells us that we are obligated not to adopt certain identities as contradictory, and gives 
us no reasons to adopt one non-contradictory identity over another.  The challenge for 
Korsgaard’s was to give a description of human nature so general it incorporates human beings 
in all their varied historical and cultural incarnations, and at the same time to demonstrate that 
our human identity has adequate content to avoid falling victim to the same charge of formalism 
leveled against Kant.  If she is unable to provide us with any means of deciding between morally 
permissible impulses we have good reason to think that this is something she is unable to do.      
     In addition, Identities such as mother, friend, or soldier have been rejected as too contingent 
to serve as a basis for moral norms.  But while Korsgaard rejects morality based on contingent 
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identities, at the same time she must incorporate the norms associated with them to generate 
norms concrete enough to direct our actions.  We have seen that the moral law is too abstract to 
solve positive moral dilemmas, and there is no reason to think that have a way to decide how to 
prioritize which person we treat as ends through our positive actions is any less important than 
knowing which negative actions we should avoid.  It would seem that no positive content is 
possible without relying on the norms associated with them, and so Korsgaard is left with the 
familiar Kantian dilemma of either admitting that her ethics is empty and purely formal, or of 
surreptitiously adopting the norms of identities she rejected as too contingent a basis for morality 
to supply that content.  This is the unavoidable outcome of treating a formal identity as the only 
one categorical enough to be the source of moral obligation. 
§ 4. Particular Actions and Universal Norms 
     We have seen that Korsgaard’s theory is deeply problematic, but the question remains 
whether Sartre’s answer to the problem of form and content is anymore satisfactory.  Sartre’s 
solution to the problem of the general and the particular must find some way other than reliance 
on a formal conception of human nature to explain moral normativity.  The fundamental problem 
for Sartre is to explain why when we act our actions must be construed as willing an ought for all 
persons rather than only for ourselves.  Concrete facticity without universal moral form lacks the 
generality necessary to constitute an ethics, and so would be objectionable because it is too 
contingent a basis by itself to generate moral norms.   
     Bell’s analysis of Sartre’s ethics proposes a possible answer to the question of how we might 
create moral norms by willing universally from our concrete circumstances.  Because a formal 
human nature is essentially empty, we are left to fashion our own conception of humanity, and 
“we need only to look to individual behavior to see what human can be and, correlatively, to see 
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what human beings should be.”78  It is for this reason that Sartre instead decides “to emphasize 
that our actions create an image of the human, as we would have it be.”79  Our projects define 
what human nature is in the concrete through our actions, and because when we will an ought we 
will universally that not only ourselves, but all persons similarly situated should act as we do.  
Not all projects and identities are equally moral however, because some further the foundational 
value of human freedom while other lead to oppression and the limitation of human freedom.  
Moral values would thus originate from our willing universally the value of human freedom 
through generalizing our actions in furtherance of concrete freedom as an example for all persons 
similarly situated to emulate.  It would be the circumstances that would give content to these 
actions, as they would take on the particular content of the circumstances in which they were 
willed.  For example, if I were to march in a protest against racism in furtherance of concrete 
human freedom that would give content to what it means to value the freedom of others.  
§ 5. Particular Identities and Moral Values 
     Bell discusses an example meant to show that Sartre’s position that our particular actions 
present a universalizable concrete example of how we believe all human beings should act 
commits Sartre to absurd outcomes.  This example, first presented by Peter Caws, suggests that 
under Sartre’s theory a person choosing to be a Jew is also willing that all people ought to be 
Jews.  But because to be Jewish is to be set apart from other ethnic groups, “those who choose to 
be Jews would never choose this for all others.” 80  The Jewish ethnic identity, just as many other 
particular identities, entails a specificity that does not allow for universalization in the same way 
a general human identity would.  Bell responds by noting that “from a moral point of view, any 
morally permissible choice must be morally permissible for others similarly circumstanced; but it 
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does not follow that every morally permissible choice is a moral choice in the sense that it is 
meant to hold for all human beings.  Within a particular set of circumstances, there may be any 
number of morally permissible choices.”81  But if this is the case it is not clear if Sartre is able to 
rely on particular identities or circumstances to provide content because this would mean that 
someone choosing to be a Jew is not willing morally for all persons because this identity is not 
universal.  This would mean that the content derived from such an identity would be contingent 
in the same way Korsgaard says it is, and would thus be unsuitable as a source of ethical norms.  
     Let us consider further the role that Sartre’s concept of facticity plays in his ethics.  Bell 
describes sex and race as elements of an individual’s facticity, both because they are part of an 
individual’s object side, and because the social interpretations of those physical facts affect the 
ways in which others interact with them.  Bell explains, “as aspects of the individual’s object-
side (the way he or she is seen by others), sex and race may, as it were, acquire a superstructure 
of social interpretation which transforms something close to brute fact into a destiny.”82   
     Ethnic, religious, class or other identities may or may not be as easily recognizable and 
socially significant as gender or racial characteristics, but in all these instances the socially 
defined other has to confront and give meaning to the way in which others see them.  The 
individual is of course free to respond in various ways by accepting, rejecting, or redefining the 
meaning society has given to their facticity, but it is a reality that shapes the context in which 
choice is excercised.  Bell notes that “women, blacks, and Jews must in some way choose 
themselves as women, blacks, and Jews.”83  The responsibility of choosing what significance to 
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give to the way others’ see us is still the individuals, but our facticity presents certain options as 
real possibilities for us while closing others off. 
Bell lays out the following examples to illustrate the point further: 
For Sartre, having a withered arm and being bourgeois are aspects of individuals’ existences regardless of 
particular choices they may make.  Admittedly the choices are important, since they establish the 
significance of the withered arm and the bourgeois status and determine whether these are handicaps or 
advantages or irrelevancies.  These are choices, however, that simply are not available to those without 
withered arms and who are not bourgeois.84 
 
Human beings are not particular yet equivalent instantiations of a generic conception of 
humanity, and our particular identities matter such that “the options of woman, black, and Jew 
are closed to white, non-Jewish males.” 85   
     We see from this discussion that our particular identities are often not as optional as 
Korsgaard would have it, since they are often at least partially the result of facts about ourselves 
that are beyond our control.  Our particular identities necessarily entail interpretations of the 
meaning of certain facts about ourselves, and these facts are not up to us.  The formation of our 
particular identities involves both objective facts about ourselves and our circumstances, and an 
exercise of our freedom as expressed through our giving meaning to these facts.     
     So we can see that choosing to be a Jew is not as simple as adopting a given stock identity 
with predetermined norms.  Beyond the objective constraints of adopting an ethnic identity one 
is not born into, there is also the question of what practices and values are sufficient, if at all, to 
constitute “Jewishness”.  While there are necessarily certain norms inherent in any particular 
identity as without them it would be impossible to distinguish one identity from another, 
adopting a Jewish identity requires answering the question of what it means to be a Jew.  This 
means that one must chose values in relation to and through the project of being a Jew, and 
brings us back to considering whether any of these values are properly considered moral.  
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     Take for example a Jewish traditionalist who thinks that part of what it means to be properly 
Jewish is to continue Jewish traditions.  Out of loyalty to his people the Jewish traditionalist 
chooses not to intermarry, goes to temple regularly, and celebrates Jewish holidays in his home.  
In so doing Sartre would say he is willing that other Jews ought also to show loyalty to their 
ethnic group by keeping their traditions alive.  From Sartre’s perspective the traditionalist is 
realizing the moral values of loyalty and respect for tradition through the project of keeping 
Jewish traditions alive. 
     To expand the point let us consider a Jewish person who goes in the opposite direction.  Let’s 
suppose that she is much more cosmopolitan in outlook and thinks that our shared humanity 
makes us basically the same, and that emphasizing our minor cultural differences just drives 
people apart.  In addition, this person prides herself on her rationality, and considers religion to 
be a useless superstition that leads to war and conflict.  She chooses not to go to temple, doesn’t 
observe the Jewish holidays, and when she meets a non-Jewish male she cares for she marries 
him without any thought that it would be better to marry a Jewish man and teach their children 
the Jewish traditions.  We can say that she is expressing the values of compassion and tolerance 
for other human beings by wanting to avoid conflicts based on ethnic and religious differences.  
Through her actions she is also creating an image of Jews as she would have them be: secular 
and cosmopolitan. 
     Both would seem to be expressing freedom through their particular Jewish identities, through 
valuing that identity through loyalty and keeping traditions alive, or through treating that identity 
as largely inessential and taking a cosmopolitan and tolerant view of humanity.  But they are 
adopting exactly opposite versions of what it means to be Jewish.  Neither is obviously 
objectionable in terms of violating human freedom, so we are left with the impression that what 
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we have are two positive images of what it means to value human freedom in terms of the Jewish 
identity that are mutually exclusive.  If Sartre cannot give us a means of determining which is 
preferable, it would seem that we are left with something resembling the dilemma of Sartre’s 
student.  If this is the case, it is not clear that Sartre’s theory is any less formal than Korsgaard’s. 
     An additional problem also arises for Sartre.  Korsgaard would acknowledge that Jewish 
identity could create an obligation to keep Jewish traditions going, but because she claims that 
moral obligations are essentially universal, Korsgaard must say that a norm based on an ethnic 
identity is not a moral norm.  Korsgaard argues that moral identity is “inescapable and 
pervasive” because it is based on a shared foundational human identity that is not “contingent or 
relative” and therefore “moral identity is necessary.”86  We may have norms associated with our 
particular contingent identities, but these norms express some other values than moral ones.  
Korsgaard can say a person has good reasons for keeping Jewish traditions alive as long as doing 
so treats other human beings as ends, but if a Jew claims to be expressing the moral value of 
ethnic loyalty based on their Jewish identity Korsgaard must simply say that they are wrong.   
     The Jewish traditionalist is willing in the general way in the way Sartre argues is required for 
moral willing, but only for those similarly situated.  Since it is only a requirement of those with 
the Jewish identity to honor and practice the traditions of the Jewish people, it is only those 
situated as Jews that may be obligated in this way.  But being issued as a moral duty it is a 
general duty that attaches to the traditionalist’s conception of what a good Jew should do, and 
those Jewish traditionalists who fall short of the norms attached to their conception of what it 
means to be Jewish would eventually lose the integrity of this identity.  The cosmopolitan Jew 
has a different conception of what it means to be a good Jew, and she would also lose the 
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integrity of her identity if she failed to live up to the norms associated with it.  The two advocate 
different images of what it means to be human and Jewish, and this is based on their placing 
priority on different values.  If the foundational value is freedom, and neither violate that norm, 
then it would seem that Sartre has no more way than Korsgaard to decide between these two 
positive conceptions of morality.  Even if Sartre is to say that they are willing morally from 
particular identities, he is no more able to decide between them on a principled basis than 
Korsgaard. 
     In either of the two cases we have mentioned the person must take account of the facticity of 
being born into a Jewish family, of Jewish history, and of social views and stereotypes associated 
with being Jewish.  Human freedom in the abstract is as empty as a universal conception of 
human nature transcending all circumstances.  Human freedom must express itself through 
concrete situations, and in response to facticity.  In doing so individuals create an image of 
humanity through their actions, and decide whether they place ethnic loyalty and tradition or 
cosmopolitan modernism and rationality as higher values.  But if in willing universally for all 
those similarly situated two Jewish persons can create they create mutually exclusive version of 
the good compatible with valuing human freedom, it is not clear how much content willing from 
particular circumstances adds.   
     And there is an additional problem for Sartre.  Let us consider the case of the Jewish 
traditionalist willing that all persons should value other persons as ends by keeping their 
traditions alive.  In the context of Jewish traditions this doesn’t seem particularly problematic, 
but if we take the maxim to be that all Jews should keep their traditions alive this doesn’t seem 
sufficiently universal.  If we say instead that all persons should value other persons should keep 
their traditions alive in some contexts this would lead to what seem like morally problematic 
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results.  Consider the tradition of white supremacy in America, and the flying of the Confederate 
flag, burning crosses, and intimidating black voters for example.  Or of a Nazi advocating Nazi 
ideology because his grandfather was a Nazi.  In these contexts keeping traditions alive would 
seem to lessen rather than increase human freedom, and would suggest why Kantians think that 
moral obligations must cover all possible circumstances. 
     I would suggest that if willing is to be truly universal that it must be based on a universal 
identity.  To say that all Jews must honor their traditions is not the same as to say that all persons 
should honor their traditions, as the previous examples illustrate.  If in acting we create an image 
of humanity universally, then it would seem to require that our willing also be universal.  
Anderson makes this point in the following passage: “If my choice of a primary value is rooted 
in my conception of man—i.e., if my choice is of that which I believe to be valuable for myself 
insofar as I am human—then in effect I do propose it as a value for all who like me are 
human.”87  But “if my choice of a my ultimate value is based instead on what I consider valuable 
to me insofar as I am a unique individual, then, in my choice of it I would not be proposing it as 
a value for any other man.88  This modification by Anderson of Sartre’s version of willing 
universally seems necessary if we are to will freedom as the foundational universal value for all 
humanity, but in doing so we in effect reduce Sartre’s position to one very close to Korsgaard’s.  
The primary difference between them would thus be that Sartre thinks that both theories are too 
abstract to provide practically useful content while Korsgaard is more optimistic, though in my 
opinion mistakenly so. 
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VI. Conclusion  
      Sartre did, in fact, eventually abandon his early Kantian ethical project as hopelessly formal.  
Basing an ethics on a conception of ethics as universal obligation led Sartre into the same trap of 
formality that Korsgaard fell into.  This is not surprising, as we have now seen how concrete 
circumstances and particular identities would need to play a necessary role in generating moral 
content if we are to avoid empty formalism.  But because an ethics based on categorical 
obligations requires such a strong sense of universality, contingent circumstances and identities 
must be rejected as unsatisfactory foundations for ethics.  This leaves one in the untenable 
position of incorporating the norms of particular identities and social practices to supply concrete 
content by simply assuming them as given, which adds a contingent quality to an approach that 
sought to above all to demonstrate that ethics categorical. 
     Sartre recognized that a universal morality that is too abstract is unable to provide adequate 
moral content to guide concrete moral choices, but was unable to provide this content himself 
within the framework of an ethics of universal obligation.  Sartre’s early ethics was based on the 
idea that the form of ethics is universal, but that its content must be particular if it is to express 
itself in a concrete context.  But Sartre was unable to present a model of ethics that explains how 
an ethics that transcends all circumstances in its universality is also able to generate particular 
content in a principled way.  This is perhaps not surprising when we consider how contradictory 
the notion of an ethics that is simultaneously concrete and universal is. 
     Sartre, nonetheless, did not abandon the goal of constructing an ethics that was both concrete 
and universal.  He instead merely rejected the Kantian framework as hopelessly abstract.  In his 
later ethics Sartre adopted a materialist Marxist approach to ethics, one that had been prefigured 
in his emphasis on the concrete and politically committed approach to ethics he was constructing 
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in Notebooks.  Sartre’s later ethics still incorporate freedom as the central value, but he realized 
that in his early ethics he was still treating man as essentially an abstract decision maker.  In his 
later ethics he developed a fuller and less formal conception of humanity, one that incorporated 
human needs as an expression of what it means to be an embodied consciousness.  Sartre sought 
to generate content through the objective restraints of being embodied, and placing objective 
value in necessary basic human needs.  Anderson notes that “needs, which demand to be 
satisfied no matter what the situation, are the source of the unconditional character of moral 
norms for Sartre.”89  In human needs Sartre found sought an objective, concrete, and universal 
element from which to derive the content that was missing in his early ethics.  Because Sartre 
thought of these needs as both universal and necessary, Sartre claimed they could serve as a 
source of universally binding obligations that are concrete and sufficiently specific to guide 
moral choice.  This was what Sartre had sought by stressing context and the particular in his 
early ethics – to give content to universal obligations through situatedness – a universal end, 
binding and non-optional, which all persons should rightfully share in common. 
     Sartre hoped this change would offer a principled way to incorporate the moral norms of 
particular societies while evaluating them in terms of an ideal universal one.  Anderson explains, 
“No matter how variable its particular content, every human moral system possesses an 
unconditional normative character, not because it is rooted in some superhuman eternal absolute, 
but because it is concretely rooted in the needs of human beings who are present in all kinds of 
conditions in different cultures and societies.”90 This is because “even the alienated moralities 
and norms of oppressive systems are rooted in, and obtain their unconditional character 
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from…human needs unconditionally requiring satisfaction.”91  This would mean “that alienated 
inhuman moralities are, at bottom, limited, truncated versions of true morality and its ultimate 
norm and goal.”92  If successful, this approach would provide for incorporating the norms of 
particular moral systems as being based on the fulfillment of human needs, while at the same 
time critiquing them as limited in failing to satisfy those needs fully.  The universal end of 
humanity would thus be that of realizing true morality in the concrete in a society that as 
perfectly as possible satisfies human needs. 
     I do have space to fully evaluate Sartre’s later ethics as successful or unsuccessful within the 
scope of this project, but I would like to suggest that it continues to suffer from the same 
problem of generating particular content from a universal norm.  Sartre’s later ethics continued 
the patter of his early ethics in thinking that the problem with Kantian ethics is that it is too 
abstract, and not concrete or empirical enough.  Sartre pushed further in the direction of filling in 
what he could only see as a formal and abstract conception of human nature as abstract decision 
maker with the conception of human nature as embodied beings with non-optional needs.  Sartre 
saw these concrete and empirical aspects of what it means to be a situated human being as a 
source of moral content, just as he indicated he thought they must be in his early ethics.  Sartre 
saw that ethics based on abstract obligation was not able to supply the needed content, and so 
Sartre looked for what was both concrete and universal about the human condition as a ground 
for ethics.   
     The problem with this approach is that an ethics that is universal enough to be binding on all 
human beings in all circumstances must necessarily be incredibly vague.  And as soon as one 
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attempts to apply it in a given concrete situation questions arise as to which needs are basic and 
which aren’t, whose needs should take priority over others given limited resources, whether 
physical needs are primary over psychological needs, whether the existence physical needs 
necessitates thinking of their fulfillment as “good”, etc.  Answering these questions requires 
more specific content, and the more specific the answers become the less likely they will hold for 
all persons universally.  Sartre’s later ethics, though more concrete, which it to say more 
empirical, still comes up against the problem of generating norms that are both universally 
binding and contain content.  The alternative, to say that there are no categorical norms that hold 
for all persons, is something Sartre rejects.  So we are left with the basic contradiction of both 
Sartre’s early ethics, and Korsgaard’s ethics, of trying to develop an ethics that is universal in 
form but has particular content.  I would suggest that this basic contradiction cannot be 
overcome, and that as a result the ethics of universal obligation is a failed conception of ethics.  
An alternative model of ethics is needed, and although I will not endeavor to present one, 
hopefully my analysis of the problem will contribute to that project in some way in locating the 
fundamental paradox in an ethics meant to be both universal and form and particular in content. 
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